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SECTION I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In the study of political science one quickly realizes 
that there are a few definitive answers to the difficult 
questions that face modern governments. Despite extensive 
research, we are still asking questions today, such ass Why 
are some people more likely than others to participate in 
politically deviant behavior? Or, why are so many people 
politically apathetic? The purpose of this paper is to lead 
us to a clearer understanding of political attitudes and 
their significance with a focus on feelings of political 
efficacy. While there are many psychological implications 
to efficacy, we will concentrate primarily on the political 
ones.
In the last two decades, many studies have been done, and 
a considerable body of literature has been written on the 
topic of political efficacy. The first section of this paper 
will be devoted to central definitions and a summary of the 
important theories on efficacy and its significance in the 
political system. In the second section I will formulate 
three general hypotheses about efficacy and will attempt to 
prove or disprove them. The data used for this section are 
based on the University of Michigan Survey Research Center 
(SRC) election study from 1980.
The concept, "sense of political efficacy" was first 
introduced in 1952 as a partial explanation for political 
participation in the United States. In The Voter Decides,
a
Campbell et al. defines the concept ast
"the feeling that individual political 
action does have, or can have an impact 
upon the political process, i.e., that 
it is worthwhile to perform one's civic 
duties. It is the feeling that political 
and social change is possible, and that 
the individual citisen can play a part 
in bringing about this change."*2' P*
Today the concept has evolved considerably. The study of 
efficacy has been especially useful in its ability to explain 
many political phenomena. As Qeorge Balch put it, the "sense 
of political efficacy can be viewed as a norm which supports 
a democratic political regime.*2,p#2* If this norm is 
internalised the individual is more likely to trust the regime 
and in turn will be less likely to challenge it. In summary, 
political efficacy has become "an important theoretical 
component in studies of individual attitude sets and belief 
systems, political behavior and the consequences that these 
attitudes and/or behavior can have upon a political system.1**#p22^  
Before I elaborate any further on political efficacy, it 
is essential that we understand this concept in the general 
context of political attitudes. Feelings of efficacy are 
interrelated with many other attitudinal concepts and I will 
refer to them throughout the paper.
POUTlCAIi ATTITUDES ""CONCEPTS 
We shall first introduce some politically positive 
attitudes toward government. To begin# political trust is a 
parallel, but separate concept to efficacy. It is defined by 
Gamson as Mthe probability of obtaining preferred outcomes 
from the political system even when this system is left 
u n t e n d e d . E f f i c a c y  and trust share the same attitude 
objects government. Thus# some have suggested that they are 
subject to the same causal influences. At times it is difficult 
to distinguish the two concepts from each other. While the 
early political scientists failed to make a distinction between 
them in the following pages their separating differences will 
become apparent.
Although some would disagree# it is the general assumption 
that those who feel efficacious and trustful toward government 
are more likely to support it. Political support is *a 
favorable orientation toward authorities# the regime and the 
political community.wt*'P**3*) Easton elabor tes on this 
definition by making the distinction between specific and 
diffuse support. To help us understand the important difference 
between specific and diffuse support he points out a well-known 
political phenomenal
"typically members of a political system 
may find themselves opposed to the political 
authorities# disgusted by their policies# 
dissatisfied with their conditions of life 
and# where they have the opportunity#
4prepared to throw the incumbents out of 
office. At times such conditions may lead 
to fundamental political or social change.
Yet# at other times, inspite of widespread 
discontent, there appears to be little loss 
of confidence in the regime #p’* 36 *
Specific support refers to attitudes a person has toward 
specific policies or incumbents. Diffuse support is an enduring 
high regard for the system, which is not dependent upon specific 
rewards•
We shall now turn our attention to negative attitudes toward 
government. The following concepts are labeled under the 
NrubricH of political discontent or dissatisfaction with the 
political system.
Political Cynclcism or high distrust “refers to the degree 
of negative affect toward the government and is a statement 
of belief that the government is not functioning and producing 
outputs in accordance with Individual expectations, ^ , p . 952) 
Political alienation is a “relatively enduring sense of 
enstrangement from, or rejection of the prevailing political 
system. •• C®#P«13) The politically alienated experience feelings 
of powerlessness, hopelessness and normlessness• These are 
people who have come “to believe that voting is meaningless and 
useless.“^®'p **3  ^ Almond and Verba add that political aliena­
tion includes both an efficacy (or input) dimension and a 
trust (or output) dimension. "If one feels he cannot contri­
bute significant input, he is likely to feel unhappy with the
5output."{8'p#13)
Finally we come to the most drastic of all negative 
political attitudes - anomie. The perspective of the anomic 
is that the politicians have failed in their obligations and 
that society has left him/her out. The anomic is put in a 
position of social isolation. Hart points out that anomie 
is consistently found with "low-economic status# physical 
isolation and membership of minority g r o u p s . *3)
EFFICACY
Since 1952, the concept of political efficacy has come 
under the scrutiny and in some cases, the criticism of many 
political scientists. Among the complaints, many suggest that 
Campbell et al.'s definition is too simplistic. They point 
out that efficacy is really a multi-dimensional concept. In 
1972 Philip Converse suggested that it is "useful conceptually, 
to partition gross feelings of political efficacy into two 
componentst" personal (internal) political efficacy and belief 
in governmental responsiveness (external political efficacy}• 
Stephen Craig defines these precisely* -
Internal efficacy - "the degree to which an individual perceives 
access, or participatory channels, as being open to him. This 
also implies that one feels competent to avail himself of the 
opportunity to use these channels should he choose to do so." 
Output efficacy - "the degree to which an individual perceives 
his political actions as being (potentially) successful. This 
introduces the notion of responsiveness, and is the dimension 
conceptually closest to that of our traditional understanding 
of the efficacy conceptp.229)
Both Hensler and Craig emphasize the significance of 
making a distinction in the dimension of efficacy: while both 
affect participation levels, internal efficacy is strongly 
related with political involvement: more so than efficacy.
Thus if one feels personally competent in the political arena, 
he is very likely to want to participate. Craig also noted
that: input efficacy was found to be “more responsive to such 
motivating personal characteristics as socio-economic status, 
political knowledge, political interest and attentiveness, 
whereas external efficacy was not.H^ ' p#*3^
George Balch, then took these findings a step further by 
suggesting that this distinction in political efficacy could 
be found in the four SEC efficacy questions, (see page 14 
for the actual questions). He notes that items two and four 
relate specifically to internal efficacy and items one and 
three relate to external efficacy. Balch recommends changing 
the SEC survey by making two separate sets of questions for 
input and output efficacy. He claims that presently Mthere is 
no adequate measure for input efficacy,"*5 23**
While the need to recognise the dimensionality of efficacy 
has been established by Hensler, Converse and Balch, the SEC 
questions remain as they were twenty-three years ago. It is 
fair to say most political scientists are aware of the multi­
dimensional levels of efficacy, but as of yet, no concensus 
on the matter has been established. This paper will therefore 
not make a distinction between the different dimensions of 
efficacy. It is, however, important to note the present 
dilemma confronting political scientists.
The final interesting point about political efficacy is 
that it, along with trust, is used as a measure of diffuse 
support. As mentioned earlier, diffuse support is an enduring 
high regard for the political system. A democratic government
8depend* upon support of this nature to maintain its legiti­
macy. Researchers believe that efficacy Mis a product of 
early socialisation, that it is learned independently of day 
to day politics, and that it persists into adulthood.w 
Thus, having developed a sense of efficacy early in life - even 
before trust - %s an adult, the individual will likely be an 
effective member of his political system.
9SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY
Judging from the apparent decline of feelings of political 
efficacy and trust, as measured by the SRC, it is accurate to 
say a situation of widespread discontent exists in America 
today. Aurthur Miller says our nation faces a "crisis of 
confidence.M^0'P**51) These statements are meaningless, 
however, unless one understands the significance of political 
discontent in terms of how it affects our political system.
The fear is that feelings of inefficacy and the like 
"may substantially diminish the willingness of citizens to 
participate in, or support the government." 951) This 
affects the very basis of our democratic system of government 
"for the people, by the people." The underlying assumption in 
a democratic government is that people will not only accept 
the government, but support it too. Without citizen partici­
pation, a democracy such as ours could not exist. Thus if it 
is proven true that political discontent promotes an unwilling­
ness to participate, the topic of political discontent is 
significant indeed.
Jack Citrin was the first to question the significance of 
political support (efficacy and trust) in an essay written in 
response to Aurther Miller's "Political Issues and Trust in 
Government." It was Miller's contention that "when support 
wanes, underlying discontent is the necessary result, and the 
potential for revolutionary altercation of the political and 
social system is enhanced.
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Individuals become very frustrated about their lack of control 
over social and political change. These feelings of powerless­
ness and normlessness "are very likely to be accompanied by 
hostility toward political leaders, institutions or government 
and the regime as a w h o l e . P *  At this point, even
removing the incumbents from office would fail to restore confi­
dence in the system.
Citrin rejects the basis of Miller's argument completely.
He implies that it is a gross exaggeration to label the politi­
cally discontent as alienated and ready for a drastic restructuring 
of the political regime. He points out that "allegiance to the 
political system does not preclude criticism of policies, 
authorities or institutions."*3' 574* He goes on to say 
that it is "possible to foster feelings of intense patriotism 
and at the same time be cynical of the political system.* ( 3 , p . 974 )  
Finally he suggests that the increased level of dissatisfaction 
may reflect a higher level of political sophistication and 
realism in the public.
Underlying these arguments is the question as to what 
factors lead people to be dissatisfied with their government.
It is Citrin's belief that satisfaction with one's government 
is a reflection of support for the incumbent in power. Miller, 
on the other hand, believes that support is an attitudinal 
measure of how people feel about the political system; whether 
or not it is responsive, or if it can be trusted. The debate 
has become a central argument among political scientists and 
is popularly called the incumbent versus system affect distinc­
tion. It is also intrinsically related to the difference
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between specific and diffuse support.
In 1979 Edward Muller and Thomas Jukam picked up the 
Citrin-Miller controversy and researched it extensively; 
noting that neither Citrin nor Miller's evidence was conclu­
sive. This was hardly an inconsequential academic debate.
The incumbent-system affect distinction had important behav­
ioral implications. As Muller and Jukam noted,if a person's 
dissatisfaction with the system was a result of system affect, 
he was more likely to participate in aggressive behavior. 
According to their theory, even if the individual did not like 
the incumbent in power, as long as he had a positive orienta­
tion toward the system as a whole, "the stability of the 
regime will not be threatened b y political protest and 
violence." illustrates perfectly the point 
that diffuse support is the motivating factor in determing 
levels of participation.
Based on their data, Muller and Jukam first concluded 
that there was indeed a distinction between incumbent support 
and political affect. Having established this, they examined 
the correlation between political affect and aggressive 
behavior. Aggressive political behavior is defined as "action 
which is illegal or disruptive of the normal functioning of 
government and may entail the use of violence."*13" ^ 156** 
Their findings showed that ideological commitment was the 
primary determinant for the potential of aggressive behavior. 
They witnessed "a strong relationship between system affect
12
and aggressive behavior, among persons with a leftist 
ideology." A much weaker relationship was found
among persons with a centrist or rightist orientation.
The question then arose as to whether trust and efficacy, 
both components of political satisfaction, were also contin­
gent upon favorable evaluations of the incumbent. Many studies 
were conducted, but none of the evidence was convincingly 
conclusive. In 198C, Shanto Iyengar of Columbia University, 
did a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis measuring 
efficacy against policy approval, interparty competition and 
incumbent support. His results clearly demonstrated that 
"unlike political trust, the sense of political efficacy did 
not appear to be closely intertwined with evaluations of the 
incumbent government."
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SECTION II
COMPUTER ANALYSIS-INTRODUCTION 
The next section of this paper will be based entirely on 
data I have computed using the 1980 University of Michigan 
National Election Study. I have independently formulated 
three general hypotheses related to the concept of political 
efficacy. These hypotheses are not necessarily elaborations 
of the studies discussed in the previous section. The purpose 
of the majority of those studies was to discover the exact 
meaning of efficacy; what it is, and what it is not. I am now 
interested in the actual people who have feelings of efficacy. 
Once I establish what groups are more likely to feel (in)effica- 
ious, I will then examine the behavioral and attitudlnal results 
of those feelings.
The following are three general hypotheses, which I will 
either prove or disprove:
I Those people in our society, who comparatively have had 
little political prestige and power are more likely to 
feel inefficacious.
II Those people who feel inefficacious in the political 
system are less likely to participate.
III Those people who feel inefficacious are more likely to 
support "regime challenging" and politically radical 
groups•
In Campbell et al.'s The Voter Decides, four agree-disagree 
items were introduced to measure one's sense of efficacy* The
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majority of all studies conducted on efficacy have used these 
four questions and their responses as a primary information 
source for their data. The following are the questions as they 
have appeared since 1952i
1. I don't think public officials care much what people 
like me think.
2. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any 
say about how the government runs things.
3. People like me don't have any say about what the 
government does.
4. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated 
that a person like me can't really understand what's 
going on.
I have taken these four questions and turned them into an 
"efficacy scale." The possible range for the scale is from 
4 (low) to 20 (high). This scale was achieved by assigning 
a number value of one to all low efficacy responses and a 
four to all high efficacy responses. To simplify matters I 
then recoded this efficacy scale by equally dividing the 
numbers into three new categories. The new scale ranked feelings 
of efficacy as 0 (low), 1 (medium) and 2 (high). I used this 
scale as my independent variable for all of the crosstabulations 
and the breakdown.
The next step in the process of computation was to choose 
dependent variables to test my three hypotheses. For Hypothesis 
X, X chose five dependent variablest education, family income,
13
age, sex and race# In the election survey, the possible 
responses for education, income and age were so extensive that 
I recoded them to simplify the graphs,
I chose family as opposed to personal income so as not to 
confuse middle or high income housewives and students who have 
no personal income of their own, with those who naturally fall 
into the poverty bracket. The breakdown was 0-$12,999 (low), 
$13,000-$22,999 (low-medium), $23,000-$49,999 (medium), $50,000 
and up (high)• I broke them down to where approximate divisions 
in economic status occur naturally due to different occupational 
pay scales. The low is clearly poverty level. Low-medium 
includes blue collar and recent college graduates. Medium is 
standard middle class. As for $55,000 and above, I felt it 
belonged in a class of its own due to the extensive range of 
incomes possible.
Education was broken down into three categories: low, 
ranged from eight grades or lees to twelve years of school, 
medium ranged from a high school diploma to some years at 
college. Under the label of high, I included graduation from 
community college, a universtiy or a graduate school. Some 
would question the comparability of a community college to a 
university or graduate degree. In judging the categories for 
education, I was looking for a certain amount of sophistication 
and understanding of politics. It is safe to assume that a 
community college education could develop, in a student, a 
comparable degree of political sophistication as a university 
or graduate school.
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Age initially ranged from 18 to 99. In breaking them 
down into groups# I was looking for overall generational 
divisions. I therefore chose# 18 thru 30 as young# 31 thru
55 as middle age and 56 thru 99 as old. I apologize to all
56 year olds for ranking them with 99 year olds# but this was 
the most sensible breakdown.
To make the comparison between my independent and depen­
dent variables# I chose two methods: crosstabulation and a 
breakdown. The majority of the following information is based 
on the crosstabs. The breakdown# did however# provide 
interesting perspectives into the levels of efficacy people of 
different socio-economic status experience.
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As previously stated, it is my first hypothesis that, 
those whom I will label as political "have-nots", are likely 
to feel ineffective when participating in the political 
system. Under the label of political Hhave notsN I include 
blacks, women, elderly, the lowly educated and the low-income. 
These judgemental classifications are based on the assumption 
that our society is still a middle class, middle age,white-male 
controlled society. The political arena is dominated by these 
men? they are the "political haves'*. Those who do not fit into 
this specific category are likely to feel "left out of it." I 
do realize this is a gross generalization. For example, the 
political role of women is becoming increasingly important 
today. However, for the sake of this general hypothesis, I will 
maintain these classifications.
It was clear from the data that the majority of the people 
interviewed had feelings of low efficacy. The mean efficacy 
rating was .89, with a standard deviation of .8. This score 
falls into the lowest of ail efficacy ratings. This indicates 
that in general, the population across-the-board, was unhappy 
with either their participation in the system, or in the systems 
responsiveness. Despite the overall negativity ratings, the 
data clearly demonstrates that some groups felt considerably 
more (in)efficacious, than did others.
ANALYSIS OF DATA
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I cannot draw any "end-allH conclusions from the following 
data, but I will try to point out distinct relationships and 
trends. Under Hypothesis I, the first subset examines the 
relationship between efficacy and education. (See Appendix A)
As I expected there was a strong correlation between efficacy 
and education; the more educated the individual was, the more 
efficacious he/she felt. Of all the subsets, education proved 
to be the strongest indicator of efficacy. Of those in the 
low efficacy group a high 66% were in low-education. Of those 
in the high efficacy group 54% were high-education. The break­
down also demonstrated a strong relationship between education 
and efficacy. The scores comparing low, medium and high 
education groups ranged from .5 to .9 to 1.3 respectively.
The crosstabulation in subset two, comparing efficacy and 
income also displayed a relatively strong correlation. (See 
Appendix B). The data showed the more money the individual had, 
the more likely he was to feel efficacious. In the low efficacy 
row, there were 54% low-income and only 31% high income.
Similiarly in the high efficacy row 19.5% were low income, with 
48% high income. These data indicate that while income is a 
strong indicator for efficacy, money does not necessarily buy 
feelings of effectiveness in the political system (but it helps!). 
One final note on income found in the breakdown was that the 
low-income, high education people expressed a significantly 
higher sense of efficacy: low-income, low education -.49 
(Dev. -.7); low-income, medium education -.73 (dev. -.8);
HYPOTHESIS I
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low-income, high education - 1.5 (dev, -8).
The crosstabulation for subset three, which compared 
efficacy and age failed to offer any definitive relationships 
(see Appendix C)• In order of feelings of efficacy, the middle 
age group ranked the highest, the young second and the old, 
the lowest. There was really very little difference between 
the young and middle age. Comparatively the old had the largest 
percentage in the low-efficacy row at 53%. Aside from this, 
however, age certainly could not be considered as an indicator 
for efficacy. The breakdown was not particularly helpful 
either, because of the small number of people interviewed in 
the dataset.
The results from subset four which compared sex and 
efficacy, were subtle yet interesting (see Appendix D). As I 
predicted, males generally feel more efficacious than females, 
but not by alot. In the low-efficacy row, men ranked 411, 
with women only 6% higher, at 47%. Under high-efficacy the 
results were similar: men 35%, women 27%. This demonstrates 
the point made earlier that women (at least white women) are 
participating more, almost to a point equal to men.
The breakdown contained some really good results demon­
strating the disparity between the sexes and socio-economic 
class. I was interested in seeing if the disparity in feelings 
of efficacy between men and women changed in different socio­
economic spheres. I used middle age in the table to keep the 
findings consistent. Finally, I only used white men and women,
20
Female
Male
because the number of blacks in these specific categories were 
too few.
Low Education Medium Education High education
Low Income Medium Income High Income
Middle Age________________ Middle Age_____________ Middle Age
.2 1.06 1.1
.5 1.08 1.4
The chart obviously tells us many things. First, regard­
less of socio-economic class, the disparity between male-female 
feelings of efficacy is very slight. This means that both the 
poor, low educated women and the rich, well-educated women feel 
about the same amount of efficacy as their male counterparts. 
This surprised me a little for I expected to find a greater 
discrepancy in the low income, low education groups. Thus, 
this data implies that one's sex really does not greatly affect 
feelings of efficacy. Aside from the question of sex, this 
chart is also a perfect example of how systematically feelings 
of efficacy increase as socio-economic status increases.
The final subset under Hypothesis I compares efficacy with 
race (see Appendix E)• The analysis was confined to a 
comparison between black and white attitudes. Simply stated, 
there was a higher percentage of blacks feeling inefficacious 
than whites. Of those in the low-efficacy row, whites 
represented 43% and blacks 55%; a 12% difference. In the high 
efficacy row there was only a 10% difference between whites and 
blacks; 31% (W), 21% (B). Again, I was surprised that there 
was not a greater discrepancy in their feelings of efficacy.
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These figures indicate that while whites still feel more 
efficacious, blacks are closing the gap quickly. This also 
demonstrates that race cannot be used as a strong indicator 
for feelings of efficacy.
We must now draw conclusions about the validity of the 
statement that blacks, women, elderly, low-income and lowly- 
educated groups, whom we have labeled as political "h->ve-nots,t 
are likely to feel inefficacious in the political system.
First we noted that when looking only, at race and sex, 
blacks and women did in fact feel more efficacious than whites 
and men. Furthermore, white men feel more efficacious than 
white women, black women and black men. However, upon closer 
examination of the data, we notice that the discrepancy in 
feelings between whites/blacks and men/women was not very large. 
From these data we may conclude that race and sex are not 
"trigger" characteristics, which automatically indicate low- 
efficacy.
The results of the age-efficacy crosstabulation do not 
indicate that age has any great affect on feelings of efficacy. 
The most important point we learned was that the elderly are 
slightly more inclined to feel inefficacious than the young 
and middle-aged.
The most significant data were found in the socio-economic 
crosstabulations and breakdown. The education-efficacy scale 
showed the strongest correlations, with the income scale coming 
in a close second. The likelihood of someone with a low 
education and little money feeling inefficacious is very high.
22
This could be explained in many ways. Perhaps education 
provides the individual with a higher level of political under* 
standing. An education either opens the doors or teaches a 
student how to open the door to political access. Educators 
often stress the importance of political participation; urging 
students to vote, write their congressmen or rally in protest.
Or perhaps a high level of education goes hand in hand with a 
high level income, which is also a strong indicator of efficacy. 
The purpose of this paper, however, is not to point out why, 
but merely to demonstrate that these relationships exist.
To return to the question at hand, our results have proven 
Hypothesis I, half true and half false. Judging from the 
data, it would appear that feelings of efficacy are more 
dependent upon socio-economic factors, rather than political. 
Hypothesis 1 would be better phrased t Those people who have 
low-education and low-incomes are more likely to feel 
inefficacious in the political system than others. Thus it is 
false to say that all political "have-nots” feel inefficacious. 
Therefore we may conclude that domination in the political 
arena is not a prerequisite for efficacy.
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Hypothesis II states that those people who feel ineffica­
cious in the political system are less likely to participate 
than people who feel efficacious. This hypothesis is concerned 
with the behavioral effects of feelings of (in)efficaciousness.
I base my hypothesis on the assumption that the low-efficacy 
group feels it is not worthwhile to participate because they 
believe nothing worth while will come of it. Either their voice 
will be left unheard, or their legislator will not pay heed to 
their demands. To test my hypothesis, I chose three dependent 
variables to crosstabulate against efficacy. Each variable 
represents a different degree of participation.
For the first subset I chose variable 134 which asks - Are 
you registered to vote? (See Appendix F) Since the survey I 
looked at was taken before the election, I used registration as 
an indication as to whether or not they would vote. I consider 
voting to be the most basic behavioral test of political 
participation. The results of the crosstabulation revealed two 
distinct correlations.
First, it is important to point out that the clear 
majority (938 out of 1,231) were registered. Of those not 
registered, 54% were in the low-efficacy category with only 
201 the high-efficacy category. This information supported the 
hypothesis with its strong correlation between low-efficacy and 
lack of participation. The surprise came in the fact that of 
the people that were registered to vote, there were more low-
HYPOTHESIS II
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efficacy people than high-efficacy: 41% low, 34% high. This 
could partially be explained by the larger numbers of people 
in the low-efficacy group to begin with. The other explanation 
could be that despite feelings of ineffectiveness, these 
individuals either still wanted to or felt it was their duty 
to vote.
For subset two I chose variable 362 which asked - Have you 
tried to convince anyone to support a candidate? (See Appendix 
G) This is another measure of participation in the political 
process. I chose this variable because lobbying for the 
candidate of one's choice implies a high desire to participate 
within established political patterns. It also implies a greater 
desire to participate, more so, than simply voting. Since we 
have ascertained that the majority of people are willing to 
vote, we will now examine greater degrees of participation.
The results for subset two were very similar in nature to 
the voting results. The majority of the respondents (852 of 
1,234) had never tried to convince anyone to support a candidate. 
Of those people, 47% were low-efficacy and only 26% were high- 
efficacy. Again these findings supported the hypothesis that 
the inefficacious are less likely to participate. However, of 
those who had tried to convince someone, the number of low and 
high efficacy people were almost the same. While the results 
from this crosstab are confusing, it serves the purpose of 
demonstrating that there are no definitive relationships on 
which we may base our decisions. In drawing a conclusion about
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this graph, there is a relatively strong relationship between 
feelings of inefficacy and non-participation. We do recognize 
however, that certain individuals, despite their feelings of 
inefficacy, are inclined as much as high efficacy people, to 
participate.
The third and final variable used to measure participation 
was 369, which the SRC labeled as H's Political Activity." This 
variable combines a variety of forms of political participation 
such as? political meetings, rallies, fund-raising dinners or 
the like. I chose this variable because those who responded 
positively to this demonstrated a great willingness to 
participate.
To begin with, of 1,234 respondents only 96 people ranked 
positively. Recognizing that this diminishes the significance 
of this part of the graph, I will not overemphasize its impor­
tance. Of those ranking in the high participation category 
231 were low efficacy and 53% were high. Again this demonstra­
tes the lack of participation of those feeling ineffacacious.
Of those in the low participation category 45% were low efficacy 
and 28% were high.
In light of the results discussed, we may conclude that 
Hypothesis II is on the whole true? people who feel ineffica­
cious are less likely to participate than those feeling 
efficacious. We do recognise that feelings of efficacy are not 
perfectly correlated with participation. Yet the trends toward 
that end are indisputable.
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Hypothesis III states that those who feel inefficacious 
are more likely to support "off center" or politically peri­
pheral groups. This question is concerned with the attitudinal 
effect of political efficacy. This statement is based on the 
premis that individuals who feel inefficacious in their 
political system are probably dissatisfied with the status quo. 
Having been repeatedly disappointed with the system# they have 
little confidence left in it. Their lack of confidence makes 
them more likely to look to different leaders for new answers. 
These are often regime-challenging leaders who are likely to 
suggest drastic and often simplistic changes to the status quo.
To test hypothesis 111 I chose the SRC feeling themometers. 
Feeling themometers are used to measure general orientations 
toward certain groups of people. The feelings are assigned 
number values# ranging from 1 to 100. For the sake of 
simplicity I recoded the variables and assigned them valuest 
1-25 (unfavorable)# 26-50 (moderately favorable)# 51-75 
(favorable)# 76-100 (highly favorable). When choosing the 
subset variables# I tried to choose radical groups to the left 
and right. Unfortunately the choices were limited. I would 
have liked to use more right-wing variables# but there were not 
enough available.
The first subset measured support for civil rights 
leaders. (See Appendix H) I recognize that civil rights 
leaders today are not as extreme as they were in the 1960's. 
Jesse Jackson would hardly use some of the same tactics as# for
HYPOTHESIS XII
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example, Malcolm X. On the other hand, civil rights is still 
considered as a movement to the left.
Unfortunately, the data produced by this crosstab was 
inconclusive. On the one hand, more of the low-efficacy group 
found civil lights leaders highly favorable than the high 
efficacy groups 40% (low) and 33% (high)• On the other hand, 
more people in the low efficacy group found civil rights 
leaders unfavorable than the high efficacy groups 47% (low) 
and 30% (high)• Thus I found no evidence with which we could 
conclusively judge Hypothesis III.
The black militant subset faired better than the civil 
rights (See Appendix I) While the findings were not conclusive, 
the graph did display some subtle trends. In categories 2, 3 
and 4, from moderately favorable to highly favorable, the low 
efficacy ranked consistently higher than the high efficacy.
The percentage differences were not very large, but a correla­
tion was apparent nonetheless.
The third subset examined support for evangelicalsi the 
only right-wing variable I found in the SRC survey. This 
crosstabulation displayed the strongest correlation between 
low efficacy and support for "off centerN groups. The results 
showed that in each category, 1 through 4, the support for 
evangelicals was stronger in the low efficacy groups than the 
high efficacy groups. Again the percentage differences were 
small; a fact which reduces the significance of our findings 
considerably.
Obviously we encountered many obstacles in determining the
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validity of Hypothesis III. In the first place, there were not 
large differences in the attitudes toward these groups between 
the low and high efficacy categories. Secondly, there was not 
a sufficient number of variables available in the SRC to pro­
perly test the hypothesis. Thirdly, when measuring support 
for civil rights and black militancy leaders it was impossible 
to insulate the measure from other feelings. Specifically, 
feelings of racial bias or hatred could affect the respondents 
answers to the feeling themometer. Therefore, these are not 
pure indications of lack of support for these groups. I would 
strongly suggest that other variable, not available from the 
SRC, be used to further test Hypothesis III.
We have examined an extensive amount of data in section two 
of this paper. While we have not made any "amazing discoveries1 
about political attitudes and their behavioral and attitudinal 
consequences, some definite correlations and trends have 
become apparent. From Hypothesis I we know that people who have 
a low income and little education are likely to feel inefficacious 
in the political arena. From Hypothesis II, we learned that 
regardless of feelings of efficacy, most people are inclined 
to vote. However, as far as greater levels of participation 
are concerned, the inefficacious are less likely to be involved.
As for Hypothesis III, we are inclined to believe that some of 
the inefficacious might be more likely to support radical groups 
that challenge the status quo, but our data is inconclusive.
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Survey research can be a very complicated process. One 
must recognize the many ways in which survey research can be 
misleading. The information for both sections of this paper 
was based on the SRC survey and for good reason. The 
University of Michigan survey is recognized throughout the 
country as being reputable and trustworthy. The following will 
be a brief discussion as to how the survey could have affected 
our results.
The first problem which we must be aware of has to do with 
human nature. People are inclined to lie if they feel the truth 
would make th*m look bad. This could have affected the data 
used in Hypothesis II and III. In Hypothesis II, subset one, the 
SRC question asked if the individual had registered to vote.
In our society the practice of voting is greatly encouraged 
and held in high esteem. A respondent who hadn't registered 
to vote might feel embarrassed or ashamed and therefore might 
lie to avoid these feelings. The same is true for questions 
asking about support for radical groups in Hypothesis III.
The norm in society is to support "centrist groups". A per­
son might feel afraid to admit that he approves of these 
radical groups and their actions. As a result, he might be 
inclined to lie. This phenomena might help explain the high 
levels of participation and the low levels of support for the 
radical groups.
Another problem encountered in the use of survey research 
is misunderstanding of the question due to ambiguity or
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complication. This was clearly not a problem with the questions 
in the efficacy scale. They were put in very simple terms and 
were written in a straightforward manner. There might have 
been a problem however, in the terms used in Hypothesis III. 
What exactly is civil rights and how is it different from black 
militancy? One can easily see where the respondents might be 
confused.
The people at the University of Michigan are constantly 
attempting to overcome the problems we have discussed. Yet as 
Professor Weissberg says, "There is no such thing as a perfect 
survey"• The important thing is that one recognizes these draw­
backs and understands how they could have an affect on the data.
In conclusion, the study of political efficacy is vital to 
our understanding of political attitudes and participation. As 
I have said before, although we did not discover any "amazing" 
correlations,I hope we have gained a clearer understanding of a 
complicated and important concept.
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